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INTRODUCTION

Courts across the country face a perplexing legal issue regarding
the ownership of church property. In the wake of the ordination of
an openly gay bishop in 2003, local congregations have broken away
from the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of
America, leading to contentious property disputes over both the real
and personal property of the churches.1 This continual religious
saga2 has lead many legal scholars and ordinary citizens alike to
wonder who should be entitled to the property after the split. The
problem that arises in adjudicating this legal issue is the sparse
continuity in court decisions addressing property ownership in the
wake of a religious "divorce." With limited guidelines articulated by
the Supreme Court,3 the states are free to craft their own arsenal for
handling church property disputes.4 As social issues' increasingly
stimulate American religious debate, the need for courts to develop
a bright-line rule for handling church divisions is ever present,
considering the likelihood that these issues will continue to drive a
wedge between congregations and higher ecclesiastical bodies.6
Virginia provides a perfect starting point for crafting a bright-line
rule that all states should eventually follow, considering the
existence of a post-Civil War statute meant to handle such religious
property disputes.
Beginning in December 2006, fifteen traditionalist Virginia
Episcopal parishes voted to break away from the Episcopal Diocese
of Virginia (the "Diocese") and the Episcopal Church of the United
1. Neela Banerjee, Church Dissidents Lose Property Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/O6/28/us/28church.html.
2. While the saga should certainly be characterized as religious by nature of the parties
involved, it does not automatically mean that a court's resolution of such church property
disputes violates the First Amendment. See infra Part I.B.
3. See infra Part I.B.2.
4. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
5. Such issues include whether the Bible recognizes homosexuality and gay marriage,
the hierarchical church's responsibility to the poor, and a woman's place within the church
hierarchy, to name a few. As American society continues to move forward, the nation will
confront new social issues, and at some point, the highly contentious issues will affect religion.
6. See Michael Paulson, EpiscopalLeaders Act To Avert a Schism, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.

26, 2007, at Al (discussing the attempt of Episcopal bishops in the United States "to head off
a schism over gay rights and biblical interpretation").
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States (the "Episcopal Church").7 The decision to disaffiliate with
the Diocese and Episcopal Church' stemmed from a disagreement
over the Episcopal Church's position on homosexuality, representing
what the parishes considered a deeper affront to the teachings of the
Christian faith and Scripture.9 The parishes voted to affiliate with
the Convocation of Anglicans in North America ("CANA"), a branch
of the Anglican Church of Nigeria." ° The parishes also incorporated
their own diocese, the Anglican District of Virginia ("ADV") on
December 5, 2006.11 As a result of the separation, the local parishes
and the Episcopal Church, along with the Diocese, have both
claimed ownership of the real and personal property presently
occupied and held by the parishes' trustees. 2
The courts left to resolve these disputes have a choice between
two different Supreme Court frameworks: the deference approach
and the neutral principles doctrine.1 3 The deference approach
7. Laurie Goodstein, National Briefing South: Virginia: Church Claims Ownership of
Property, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at A12. Members of the fifteen Virginia congregations
represent about 7 percent of the Diocese of Virginia. Michelle Boorstein, Trial Begins in Clash
Over Virginia Church Property,WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2007, at B01.
8. See infra Part II.A. for a discussion on the difference between the Diocese and the
Episcopal Church.
9. Anglican District of Virginia, Legal Background, http://www.anglicandistrictof
virginia.org/ (follow "Legal Defense") (last visited Sept. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Legal
Background]; see also Alan Cooperman & Michelle Boorstein, Congregants in Legal Limbo
Over Who Gets the House, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2007, at B03 ("The theological disputes go
back more than 30 years to controversies over the ordination of women and changes in the
Book of Common Prayer. Conservatives say that consecration of New Hampshire Bishop V.
Gene Robinson, who is gay, was the latest move by the Episcopal Church away from Christian
orthodoxy."); Boorstein, supra note 7 ('Traditional Anglicans are frustrated with decades of
what they see as watered-down Christianity, and the dispute threatens to split the
Communion.").
10. Legal Background, supra note 9. The Anglican Church of Nigeria is a constituent
member of the Anglican Communion, comprising over seventy-seven million members
worldwide. Id. The Anglican Communion serves as the worldwide affiliation for Anglican
Churches across the globe in full communion with the Church of England and its primate, the
Archbishop of Canterbury. The Anglican Communion Official Website, Anglican Communion
Information Leaflet, http://www.anglicancommunion.org/resources/acis/pdf/ac.pdf (last visited
Sept. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Information Leaflet]. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the
organization of the Episcopal Church.
11. Legal Background, supra note 9.
12. Only eleven of the fifteen breakaway congregations are involved in the litigation over
the church property in Northern Virginia worth an estimated $30 million. Boorstein, supra
note 7.
13. See infra Part I.
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requires courts to accept the decision regarding property ownership
made by the hierarchical church's judicial bodies, 4 while the neutral
principles approach allows courts to determine the question of
property ownership so long as the decision is based on neutral
principles of law. 15 Under the neutral principles of law doctrine,
states are free to craft their own mechanism for handling religious
property disputes so long as their courts refrain from deciding any
doctrinal issues.
Virginia enacted a statute long before the existence of the current
church property dispute within its borders and long before the
establishment of the neutral principles of law doctrine in Jones.
Virginia Code section 57-9 specifically addresses who retains legal
title to church property when a division occurs within a hierarchical
church. The statute grants congregations the right to determine, by
majority vote, to which branch of the church the congregation
wishes to belong if a division occurs within the church. 6 If the
determination is approved by the court, it shall be conclusive as to
the title to and control of any property held in trust for the congregation. 1 7 The key interpretive question of Virginia Code section 57-9
is how one defines a "division" within a church.
This Note argues that, in order to create uniformity within the
Commonwealth of Virginia," "division" as used in section 57-9
should mean a factional separation within the hierarchical church
between the national church and an aggregate of congregations. A
factional separation only occurs if an aggregate of congregations,
determined on a macro-level, disaffiliates with the national church
due to distinct views of church doctrine. The nature of the church
doctrine has no relevance to the determination of division; the
analysis should focus solely on whether the aggregate of congregations are separating from the national church because of the same
doctrinal dispute. If no such division has occurred and a parish
14. See generally Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
15. See generally Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (2007).
17. Id.
18. Cooperman & Boorstein, supra note 9 ("[I]ndependent legal experts say part of the
problem is that the law in this area has become increasingly unsettled as courts in various
states have taken differing approaches and arrived at differing conclusions about who gets
the assets in a church divorce.").
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votes to disaffiliate from the church, then the parish abandons the
property held by the parish's trustees. The hierarchical church to
which the parish previously belonged would then become the
rightful owner of the property by nature of their claim to the
property and the invalid action of the local church in voting to
disaffiliate.
In order to settle the present dispute among the eleven Virginia
Episcopal parishes, as well as any future disputes among congregations and the hierarchical church to which they belonged, courts
should adopt the bright-line rule proposed by this Note. Such an
approach will be beneficial for the judicial system because it will
enable courts to resolve church property disputes expeditiously by
addressing the sole question of whether a division existed within the
church. Churches within Virginia will benefit equally from a brightline rule because knowing how a court will resolve their property
dispute may prevent congregations from taking certain separational
actions in the first place. Likewise, a bright-line rule may persuade
congregations to settle their disputes internally as opposed to
seeking recourse in the judicial system.
Part I of this Note traces the development of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on how courts should decide church property disputes
and the implications of the Court's decisions on the ability of states
to approach the property issue. Part II analyzes the Canons and
Constitution of the Episcopal Church regarding church property
disputes and how these religious laws should factor into courts'
decisions as to the rightful owner of the contested church property.
Part III addresses the constitutionality of Virginia Code section 579, specifically whether the existence and application of the statute
violates the Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. Part IV explores the crucial question of how
courts should define the term "division," as used in Virginia Code
section 57-9; the answer to this question will center on how courts
have defined "division" in other contexts, as well as how courts
should interpret the statute from a policy perspective. Part IV
discusses the property law theory of abandonment and its application to the present church property disputes. Finally, this Note
considers the benefits of creating a bright-line rule for resolving
church property disputes considering the likelihood that such
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disputes will continue to erupt across the country as religious beliefs
held by local parishes and the hierarchical church diverge.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE ON
How To RESOLVE CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES
The Supreme Court has articulated two divergent methods for
resolving church property disputes: the deference approach and the
neutral principles doctrine.19 The Supreme Court first articulated
the deference approach as the proper means for handling intrachurch property disputes," and not until a century later did the
Court accept a different manner for resolving property disputes in
the wake of a church divorce.2 1 The deference approach requires
courts to accept the resolution reached by judicial bodies of the
hierarchical church on intra-church disputes.22 The neutral
principles doctrine, on the other hand, focuses on courts resolving
church property disputes by interpreting church documents relating
to the contested property without deciding any questions of religious
doctrine.2" Both approaches articulated by the Supreme Court reveal

19. Kathleen E. Reeder, Note, Whose Church Is It, Anyway? Property Disputes and
Episcopal Church Splits, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 125, 129 (2006) ("While both
approaches have their adherents, neither is applied with great consistency, and legal scholars
have written extensively about how difficult it is for local parishes to order their affairs in the
face of this analytical quagmire."); see also Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court
Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98 COLuM. L. REV. 1843, 1863 (1998) ("A
look at appellate decisions, which develop alternatives among the options the Supreme Court
has left open, reveals that the law is less straightforward than one might suppose from
reading the Court's jurisprudence.").
20. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
21. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
22. Watson, 80 U.S. at 727.
23. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03. The Supreme Court articulated the following rationale for
the neutral principles approach:
[I]t is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate
all forms of religious organization and polity. The method relies exclusively on
objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers
and judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts completely from
entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.
Id. at 603.
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an uneasiness by the judicial system to intervene in disputes
involving issues of religious doctrine.24
A. The Deference Approach: The Supreme Court's InitialAttempt
at Solving Church PropertyDisputes
1. The PresbyterianChurch and Its DoctrinalDivision over
Slavery
The Supreme Court's first taste of a religious property dispute
came in the seminal case of Watson v. Jones.2 5 In Watson, the
members of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church of Louisville,
Kentucky, divided into two distinct bodies, each claiming exclusive
use of the property owned by the local church.2 6 The dispute began
shortly after the Civil War ended, when the General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church issued resolutions expressly supporting
the emancipation of slaves within the states formerly belonging to
the Confederacy.27 The resolutions also instructed the lower
branches of the church hierarchy to require anyone applying for
membership or a ministerial position who had been found guilty of
aiding the Confederacy or advocating slavery as a divine institution
to repent those sins before being accepted into the church.2" A few
months later, the Presbytery of Louisville published a pamphlet
denouncing the General Assembly's resolutions, expressly declaring
that it would not follow the Assembly's instructions for admission

24. The Supreme Court in Watson revealed its uneasiness by simply deferring to the
church hierarchy's decision regarding property ownership, while the Court in Jones warned
courts not to address any questions regarding the doctrinal dispute between the parties.
25. Slavery drove a wedge between local churches and the national church during the
Civil War Era just as homosexuality is driving a wedge between local Episcopal churches and
the national church today. See Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 1847-52, for the history behind
Watson v. Jones.
26. Watson, 80 U.S. at 681.
27. Id. at 690-91. The hierarchical structure of the Presbyterian Church consists of the
following tribunals in ascending order: (1) the Church Session, composed of the elders of the
local church; (2) the Presbytery, composed of the local churches in a certain geographical
region; (3) the Synod, composed of all Presbyteries generally within a state; and (4) the
General Assembly, the governing body that reigns over the entire church structure. Id. at 727;
Presbyterian Church v. Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 441-42 (1969).
28. Watson, 80 U.S. at 691.
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of its new members.2 9 In refusing to be governed by the resolution,
the Presbytery invited all members of the Presbyterian Church who
shared in the Presbytery's beliefs to join in their resistance."0
The Walnut Street Church, under the jurisdiction of the Presbytery of Louisville, divided into two factions, one supporting the
General Assembly and its denunciation of slavery, and the other
supporting the Presbytery and its resistance of the "usurpation of
authority" by the Assembly. 31 The General Assembly ultimately
declared that the faction of the Presbytery and the Synod of
Kentucky-which had refused to adhere to the Assembly's
resolutions-no longer acted under the true doctrine of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. 32 These factions
were permanently excluded from representation in the Assembly.3 3
The other factions were declared the true Presbytery of Louisville
and Synod of Kentucky.34 Both sides claimed a right to possession
of the Walnut Street Church property, and a protracted legal
struggle resulted, ending up in the hands of the Supreme Court.
2. The Supreme Court's Categorizationof Church Property
Disputes
The Supreme Court in Watson articulated three different
categories of church property disputes. The first category includes
express trust disputes in which the contested property has been
expressly devoted by deed or will to the teaching of a specific
religious doctrine.35 The second are congregational church disputes
in which the church property is held by an independent organization
with no obligation to any higher authority.3 6 The third category
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 692.
32. Id. The division over the authority of the Assembly's resolutions occurred not only on
the level of the local congregation within the Walnut Street Church, but on the level of the
Presbytery of Louisville and the Synod of Kentucky. Id. at 727. Each opposing party asserted
that it constituted the true Presbytery and the true Synod, while both recognizing the General
Assembly as the highest branch of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 722.
36. Id.
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consists of hierarchical church disputes in which the congregation
holding the property is a "subordinate member of some general
church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical
.37
tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control ...
In the first category, the court must determine whether the
property has been diverted away from the trust and whether there
are persons qualified within the meaning of the original dedication
who are willing to teach the doctrines prescribed in the trust.3" If
such persons exist, then they have complete authority to prevent the
property from being used in contravention of the trust, even if a
majority of the congregation wishes to use the property in support
of a conflicting doctrine." In the second category, when a schism
results in the independent congregation and both factions claim a
right to use the church property, ordinary principles that govern
"voluntary associations" should control the court's decision.4" If the
church vests power in a governing body, then the governing body
has sole authority to determine which faction controls the
property.4 1 The court makes no inquiry into the religious opinion of
the congregation, solely focusing on the governing structure in place
for making congregational decisions.4 2
The third category of church property disputes encompassed the
property quarrel of the Presbytery Church at issue in Watson.4 3 The
Court stated that the property of the Walnut Street Church was not
devoted forever by an express trust to the support of any special
religious doctrine, but rather had been purchased for the use of a

37. Id. at 722-23.
38. Id. at 723.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 725.
41. Id.
42. The Supreme Court decided Watson decades before the Court incorporated the
Establishment Clause against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Even though the
Establishment Clause did not apply to the states, the Supreme Court allowed the principles
behind it to influence its decision in Watson.
43. The Episcopal Church, like the Presbyterian Church, is also a hierarchical
organization. A general convention and presiding bishop govern the national church while a
diocesean convention and local bishop govern each local diocese. Natalie L. Yaw, Comment,
Cross Fire: JudicialIntervention in Church Property DisputesAfter Rasmussen v. Bunyan,
2006 MICH.ST. L. REv. 813, 817 (2006).
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religious congregation.4 4 The Court further declared that "so long as
any existing religious congregation can be ascertained to be that
congregation, or its regular and legitimate successor, it is entitled
to the use of the property."4 5 Essentially, a local congregation is
entitled to continued use of the church property so long as it adheres
to the doctrines of the church canon law. Because the local congregation is a member of a much larger religious organization, property
succession determinations must be made by the higher organization
whose orders and judgments the lower congregation is bound to
follow. The Court concluded:
In this class of cases we think the rule of action which should
govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the
relations of church and state under our system of laws ...
is, that,
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the
legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as
binding on them, in their application to the case before them.4 6
Based on this deferential approach to church hierarchy, the Court
affirmed the circuit court decision granting the property rights to
those members of the church in alliance with the General
Assembly.47 The Court reasoned that local congregations in a
hierarchical church give implied consent to the church governing
body to resolve all church matters. Thus, any decision made by the
hierarchy regarding a division among lower branches must be final
on the issue of church property.4 8

44. Watson, 80 U.S. at 726.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 727.
47. Id. at 735.
48. Id. at 729.
The bases for the Court's approach are not hard to grasp. If civil courts were to
deny church property to a body that would otherwise control it because the body
has been guilty of a "departure from doctrine," civil courts would address
matters for which they are woefully ill-suited, and the legal rule would frustrate
changes in religious understandings.
Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 1851.
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3. The Flaws in the Supreme Court's Uneasiness To Decide
Church Property Disputes
The problem with the deference approach is that it almost
invariably favors the national church in the wake of the religious
divorce.4 9 While the deference approach allows a court to remove
itself from deciding questions of faith by establishing a bright-line
rule for courts to follow when faced with such a contentious religious
issue,5 ° the rule should not be so bright that the national church
always prevails. The only cases that courts would review would be
those in which the church authoritative body decided against the
local church, because if the hierarchy awarded the property to the
local church, then there would be no need to appeal to the courts.
Then-Justice Rehnquist noted this problem with the deference
approach in his dissent in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich,5" stating that the approach makes "available the
coercive powers of civil courts to rubber-stamp ecclesiastical
decisions of hierarchical religious associations .. This so-called
rubber-stamping by the courts is the fatal flaw of the deference
approach. A bright-line rule certainly is warranted in these religious
property disputes, but the courts should not adopt one that always
favors the national church's property claim.
Another problem inherent in the Court's deference approach is
the implied consent theory that local churches, by nature of
belonging to the hierarchical organization, give their consent to any
decisions made by those bodies higher in the church structure.
Professor Kent Greenawalt captures one of the defects in the
implied consent theory by noting that, while local congregations
generally consent to the hierarchy's decisions, this consent is
conditional on the hierarchy following the rules of the church-or at
least not radically shifting the church's tenets of faith, like admit49. Reeder, supra note 19, at 133-35 ("When applying the deference approach, the deck
is essentially stacked in favor of the national church, which acts as both a party to the dispute
and an adjudicator whose decision will be entitled to great deference by the courts.");
Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 1864 ("Although the highest judicial authority in a church
might award property to a local church against the national legislature and executive, the
typical consequence of deference is that local church property is held for the general church.").
50. See Reeder, supra note 19, at 133.
51. 426 U.S. 696, 734 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
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ting women or gays as priests for the first time, or aligning with an
atheist government.5" A generalization that members give implied
consent to whatever the hierarchy does is untenable because it fails
to take into account the individualized conceptions of the church by
each member.5 4
In addition to the fallacy that local churches give unequivocal
support to the hierarchy's decision-making body, the implied consent theory implicates the old-English doctrine of implied trust,
which the Supreme Court rejected in Watson. The English doctrine
of implied trust is the legal fiction that local church property is held
in trust for the advancement of the hierarchical church's religious
doctrine and that it is the duty of the courts to determine the nature
of the church's original doctrine and award the property to the
faction adhering to that doctrine. 5 Even though the Court rejected
the implied trust doctrine, it essentially perpetuated a similar legal
fiction by declaring that local churches give implied consent to the
decision-making bodies of the hierarchical organization. 6
The Court rejected the implied trust doctrine in favor of the
implied consent theory because the Court wished to defer to church
authoritative bodies instead of determining which faction continued
to adhere to the original tenets of faith, as required by the implied
trust doctrine. 57 As noted earlier, by giving implied consent, local

53. Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 1874. Kathleen Reeder makes a similar observation
regarding the implied consent theory of Watson:
This implied consent approach rather simplistically accepts that once a local
church has become a member of the national church and received some benefits
of affiliation, it is subject to the decisions of the national church.... None of these
factors proves or even addresses the intent of the local church, let alone any
property donor who may lurk in the historical background. Rather, this
approach overwhelmingly favors the national church and accepts a onedimensional concept of consent that the law is wary to import into any other
area.
Reeder, supra note 19, at 136-37 (footnote omitted).
54. Reeder, supra note 19, at 136-37.
55. Note, JudicialIntervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 1142, 1146 (1962).
56. See Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property DisputesAmong Religious
Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 559 (1990) ("In place of a finding of actual intent to
create a trust in favor of the hierarchy, courts have relied primarily on the concept of implied
consent to the hierarchy's rules.").
57. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727-29 (1879).
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churches almost invariably lose the property dispute.5 8 If the
national church or diocese retains the property in the wake of a
doctrinal division, this effectively creates a trust-like doctrine: the
local church holds the property for the benefit of the hierarchy, and
any schism over the hierarchy's tenets of faith which leads the local
church to disaffiliate will result in the property belonging to the
higher church body. By giving its implied consent to the judicial
bodies of the church, a local church's property rights exist only as
long as the church remains in unison with the tenets held by the
judicial body. If the judicial bodies are likely to rule in favor of the
national church or diocese, then the property must be said to be held
in some type of trust for the hierarchical organization because it
ultimately makes the determination of possession in its own favor.
Even though the determination of which faction continues to adhere
to the original doctrines of the church is eliminated by the implied
consent theory,59 the deference approach cannot escape criticism for
creating a new mechanism for hierarchical churches to keep what
they consider their property in the wake of a doctrinal rift. °
B. A New Outlook on Church Property Disputes: The Supreme
Court's NeutralPrinciplesDoctrine
1. Laying the Groundwork for the NeutralPrinciplesApproach
The Supreme Court adhered to the three part analysis-and,
specifically, the deference approach-for decades following Watson
v. Jones.Some believe, however, that Watson essentially established
the neutral principles doctrine later articulated in Jones v. Wolf
rather than the deference approach historically accredited to the
case. 6 ' They view the property dispute at issue in Watson as nominal
in comparison to the religious dispute over the morality of slavery."
58. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
59. It is this elimination that led the Supreme Court to believe that it had rejected the
English doctrine of implied trust in favor of an approach that focused on the decisions of the
judicial tribunals of the hierarchical church, which use their own ecclesiastical laws and
religious faith to settle the church property dispute.
60. See infra Part III.B.
61. See, e.g., John E. Fennelly, Property Disputes and Religious Schisms: Who Is the
Church?, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 319, 321 (1997).
62. Id.
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These scholars argue that the Court understood the gravity of the
religious doctrinal dispute, and by deferring resolution to the church
hierarchy, it followed neutral principles of law.6 3 While some
validity may exist in this analysis of Watson, most legal scholars
generally accredit Presbyterian Church in the United States v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial PresbyterianChurch 4 as the
Supreme Court case ushering in the notion of applying neutral
principles of law to religious property disputes, as opposed to only
deferring to the hierarchical church's adjudication of the dispute.6"
In Blue Hull, two local Georgia churches withdrew from the
Presbyterian Church of the United States over doctrinal disputes
regarding the national church's endorsement of ordaining women,
opposition to the Vietnam War, and support for removing prayer
from public schools.6 6 The Presbyterian Church acknowledged the
withdrawal by taking possession of the church property. 7 Instead
of appealing the decision of the commission appointed by the
Presbytery of Savannah to the higher tribunals of the Presbyterian
Church, the local churches went straight to the courts.68 The
dissidents filed suit to enjoin the national church from trespassing
on the church property, which they believed the local churches
legally possessed based on Georgia's implied trust theory.6 9 The trial
court submitted the case to the jury with the instruction to apply
Georgia's departure-from-doctrine test, the legal analysis employed
when the implied trust theory applies to resolve a church property
dispute in the wake of doctrinal division.7" Accordingly, local church
property was to be considered held in trust for the national church
63. Id. The Court, while recognizing that the issue had to be decided, followed a
minimalist course that would neither impinge on religious freedom nor immerse the judiciary
in doctrinal controversy. To effectuate the primary concern, religious liberty, the Court turned
to neutral common law concepts of voluntary associations and contract. Watson, thus, is the
first example of neutral principles being used by the Supreme Court to resolve what was
essentially a religious dispute.
64. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
65. Reeder, supra note 19, at 138; Yaw, supra note 43, at 823 ("[Blue Hull] was perhaps
the first case that recognized the possibility of applying neutral principles of law to
ecclesiastical property disputes without erasing the line between church and state.").
66. 393 U.S. at 442 n.1 (1969).
67. Id. at 443.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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so long as the national church adhered to its tenets of faith practiced at the time of the local church's affiliation.7 1 The departurefrom-doctrine test required the court to determine whether actions
of the hierarchical church constituted such "substantial departure"
from the practices and beliefs existing at the time of the local
parish's affiliation that the court had to terminate the implied trust
in favor of the hierarchical church.7 2
Applying this test, the court left the jury to decide whether the
Presbyterian Church fundamentally abandoned its original tenets
to the point that its new tenets were completely irreconcilable with3
the purpose for which the Presbyterian Church was established.
The jury found in favor of the local churches, resulting in the
termination of the trust and enjoinment of the national church from
trespassing on the property owned by the dissidents." With the
Georgia Supreme Court affirming the decision, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider the implications of the decision and
the departure-from-doctrine test under the First Amendment.7 5
The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the implied trust
theory as violating the First Amendment because of its requisite
departure-from-doctrine test,7" which the Court declared as
unconstitutionally requiring civil courts to determine matters "at
the very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church

71. Id.
72. Id. at 449-50. The departure-from-doctrine test involved a two part determination for
resolving intra-church property disputes: (1) the court first decided whether the actions of the
hierarchical church departed substantially from prior doctrine; and (2) if the court found a
substantial departure, then it had to determine whether the issue on which the hierarchical
church had departed is of such importance to the theology of the church to require the implied
trust be terminated. Id. at 450.
73. Id. at 443-44.
74. Id. at 444.

75. Id. When the Supreme Court decided Watson v. Jones, it had not yet declared that the
First Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Yaw, supranote
43, at 821. Thus, its rejection in Watson of the implied trust theory was not based on a
violation of the First Amendment by the states, but rather "American notions of religious
liberty." Fennelly, supra note 61, at 322.
76. On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the implied trust theory no
longer could be used to resolve church property disputes given the Supreme Court's finding
that the departure-from-doctrine test violated both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Presbyterian Church v. E. Heights Church, 225 Ga.
259 (1969).
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doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to religion. 7 7
Despite acknowledging that the First Amendment circumscribes the
role of civil courts when resolving church property disputes, the
Supreme Court admitted that the courts have the ability to decide
such religious property disputes without immersing themselves in
decisions of doctrinal dispute:
Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by
opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And
there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all
property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing"
churches to which property is awarded. But FirstAmendment
values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation
is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies
over religious doctrine and practice.78
By recognizing that neutral principles exist to resolve property
disputes in a religious "divorce" case, the Supreme Court laid the
groundwork for its decision a decade later in Jones v. Wolf.
2. Jones v. Wolf: Neutral PrinciplesGuide the Way in a Church
DoctrinalDivorce
In Jones v. Wolf, the Presbyterian Church yet again served as the
vehicle for the Supreme Court to articulate a new approach for
resolving intra-church property disputes in a hierarchical church
organization: the neutral principles doctrine.79 The majority of a
local Georgia Presbyterian church voted to separate from the
Presbyterian Church in the United States and unite instead with
the Presbyterian Church in America.8" The majority faction retained
the church property, forcing the minority members of the church to
conduct their religious activities at another location." In response
to the schism, the Presbytery encompassing the local church appointed a commission to investigate and hopefully resolve the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 450.
Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
443 U.S. 595 (1979).
Id. at 598.
Id.
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dispute." In holding true to the assertion that the national church
will likely always find in its favor, the commission declared that the
minority faction constituted the true congregation of the local
Presbyterian church." The majority faction ignored the commission's opinion by continuing to possess the church property and by
not appealing the commission's decision to a higher Presbyterian
Church tribunal.' In light of the majority's actions and the commission's determination, the minority faction sought a declaratory and
injunctive order establishing their right to exclusive possession of
the property and expelling the majority faction from the premises. 5
The Georgia trial court applied Georgia's neutral principles of law
approach, adopted in the wake of Georgia's last run-in with the
Supreme Court over a religious property dispute incorrectly decided
on doctrinal grounds. 6
Justice Blackmun defined the issue before the Court as whether
civil courts may resolve a church property dispute on the basis of
neutral principles of law or whether they must defer to the resolution of the hierarchical church in order to avoid any First or
Fourteenth Amendment problems.8 The Supreme Court recognized
that church disputes solely regarding the doctrinal position of
the church must be left to the highest tribunal of the hierarchical church organization for resolution.88 But absent this First
Amendment restriction on civil courts, states were free to adopt any
method for resolving church property disputes.8 9 The Court
specifically endorsed the neutral principles doctrine, in the form
developed by Georgia over the past decade, as one such constitutionally acceptable method for resolving church property disputes.9 °
To apply neutral principles to a church property dispute, courts
must look at deed language, terms of local church charters, state
statutes governing the holding of church property, and provisions in

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

598-99.
599.
597.
602.

at 602-03.
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church constitutions9 ' concerning ownership and control of church
property.9 2 When examining these documents, the court must look
for any language indicating that the property titled to the local
church is held in trust for the hierarchical church organization.93
The court must analyze these documents on purely secular terms
and must "not ...
rely on religious precepts in determining whether
the document indicates that the parties have intended to create a
trust."9 4 If the property is held in trust for the hierarchical church,
then the court must grant control of the property to the national
church; if no trust was created in favor of the hierarchical church,
then the dissident majority faction may be entitled to ownership.9"
On its face, the Supreme Court seemed to articulate a simple and
straightforward method for resolving church property disputes in a
manner not offensive to the First Amendment.
The premise behind the neutral principles doctrine is that courts
should rely on concepts of property law and authoritative church
documents that can be interpreted without invoking religious
doctrine and without deciding whether the local or national church
departed from the tenets of the true church when resolving intrachurch property disputes. The Court enumerated several advantages of applying the neutral principles method to church property
disputes:
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are
that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough
to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity.
The method relies exclusively on objective, well-established
concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and
judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts completely from
entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and
practice. Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis shares the
peculiar genius of private-law systems in general-flexibility in

91. The neutral principles approach does not preclude the courts from looking at religious
documents to resolve church property disputes. Using religious documents to determine the
rightful owner of real and personal property does not implicate questions of religious doctrine
so long as the court interprets the doctrine in light of secular concepts of law. Id. at 604.
92. Id. at 603-04.
93. Id. at 604.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 611 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions
of the parties.96
The Court ultimately remanded the case back to the Georgia courts
to determine which faction was entitled to the property as a matter
of state law.97 Justice Blackmun left one final warning to the
Georgia courts: if the resolution of the property dispute hinges on
determinations of religious doctrine, then the courts must defer to
the decisions of the hierarchical church tribunals because only those
authoritative bodies are vested with power to decide disputes over
doctrine.98
The Supreme Court's endorsement of the neutral principles
doctrine certainly lacked unanimous support from the justices.
Justices Powell, Stewart, White, and Chief Justice Burger all dissented, believing that the neutral principles doctrine in practice
would lead only to more involvement by the courts in religious
affairs.9 9 The dissent disagreed with the majority's analysis that the
case involved a dispute over the ownership of church property
because ownership of the property was clearly evidenced by the
deeds placing title in the local Presbyterian church.' 0 Rather, the
true issue in such hierarchical church property disputes, according
to the dissent, was which faction should be entitled to control and
possession of the property, 1 1 a question that almost inevitably
entangles the courts in matters of religious doctrine and belief.
Furthermore, the dissent decried the likelihood that the neutral
principles approach would lead to more confusion than understanding ' 2 because of the lack of standards provided by the majority, as
96. Id. at 603 (majority opinion).
97. Id. at 609-10.
98. Id. at 604 ("In addition, there may be cases where the deed, the corporate charter, or
the constitution of the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions
relating to the ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments
of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court
must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.").
99. Id. at 610 (Powell, J., dissenting); Reeder, supra note 19, at 143 ("Justice Powell's
dissenting opinion in Jones recognized that the neutral principles approach was not a cure-all
for the ills of deference....").
100. Jones, 443 U.S. at 610 (Powell, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Fennelly, supranote 61, at 334 ("[N]eutral principles, as the dissenters noted, was left
undefined in the majority opinion. Thus, rather than adhering to a long-standing and widely
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well as the intrinsic doctrinal content of the church documents the3
majority proposed as guiding the neutral principles analysis.1
Because of the constitutional implications inherent in the neutral
principles method, the dissent recommended that state courts
continue to defer to the decisions of the ecclesiastical bodies of the
hierarchical church organizations:
Disputes among church members over the control of church
property arise almost invariably out of disagreements regarding
doctrine and practice. Because of the religious nature of these
disputes, civil courts should decide them according to principles
that do not interfere with the free exercise of religion in accordance with church polity and doctrine. The only course that
achieves this constitutional requirement is acceptance by civil
courts of the decisions reached within the polity chosen by the
church members themselves. The classic statement of this view
is found in Watson v. Jones.'
The dissent's criticism of the neutral principles approach certainly
struck a chord with legal scholars who suggested that the Supreme
Court should have continued to endorse the Watson deference
approach for resolving intra-church property disputes in the wake
of a doctrinal divorce. 105
The takeaway from Jones v. Wolf, however, is not the articulation
of the neutral principles doctrine or the dissent's favoritism for the
deference approach. Rather, it is the freedom of the states to choose
for themselves which method to employ when resolving church
accepted rule, state courts instead departed from Watson, and were set adrift in a sea of
constitutional uncertainty.").
103. Jones, 443 U.S. at 612-13.
104. Id. at 616-17 (citations omitted).
105. See Fennelly, supra note 61, at 333-34 ("From a stare decisis standpoint, it is difficult
to understand the direction taken by the majority in Wolf. Watson had delineated a clear and
workable test for resolving intra-church disputes that were invariably doctrinal in nature. The
majority advanced no argument that Watson was wrongly decided, had unforeseen negative
consequences, or in any way outlived its usefulness. Its rationale had gained wide acceptance
at the state level and, therefore, gave stability and predictability to an admittedly difficult
area of constitutional law."); Reeder, supra note 19, at 144 ("How fresh is the neutral
principles approach articulated in Jones? Does it truly provide a framework for a more
equitable assessment of which party should control the disputed property"). But see
Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 1901 ("The flaws of the [deference] approach are great enough
to make some type of neutral principles approach preferable.').
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property disputes. It is this freedom, which the Supreme Court
declared the states have, that has resulted in uncertainty in
determining the likely outcome of a church property dispute."°6 The
legal system needs to address this uncertainty because church
property disputes are not merely intra-state, considering that the
hierarchical church body usually exists on the national level. The
Commonwealth of Virginia has the potential to provide an example
for the rest of the Union as to how such disputes can be resolved in
an efficient and straightforward manner.

II. THE LAW OF THE CHURCH: THE CONSTITUTION AND CANONS OF
THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH

A. The HierarchicalOrganizationof the Episcopal Church
In 1789, the Protestant Episcopal Church was formally organized
in Philadelphia as the successor to the Church of England in the
colonies. °7 Unlike the Roman Catholic Church, there is no single
governing structure vested with universal authority for all member
churches of the Episcopal Church. 10 8 The Anglican Communion
serves as the worldwide affiliation for Anglican Churches"0 9 across
the globe in full communion with the Church of England and its
primate, the Archbishop of Canterbury. 10 The Archbishop of
Canterbury, however, has no formal authority outside of the
jurisdiction of the Church of England."' '"The churches of the
Anglican Communion are held together by bonds of affection and
106. See Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 1895 ("Knowing that a court will use a neutral
principles approach alone may not provide competing claimants with much of a guide as to
how a case will be decided.").
107. Anglican Timeline, http://justus.angican.orgtresources/timeline/lIecusa.html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2008).
108. See Richard Vara, What Will the ChurchDecide?:EpiscopalBishops GatherTo Discuss
Futurein Anglican Communion, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 10, 2007, at R1.
109. Not all members of the Anglican Communion use the word Anglican in their names.
Anglican.org, About Our Church, http://www.anghcan.org/church/index.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2008). The Episcopal Church of the United States, the province of the Anglican
Communion covering the United States, uses the word Episcopal rather than Anglican. See
Vara, supra note 108. The use of the word Episcopal makes no difference in regard to
membership to the Anglican Communion. Anglican.org, About Our Church, supra.
110. See Vara, supra note 108.
111. See id.
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common loyalty, expressed through links with the 'Instruments of
Communion'-the Archbishop of Canterbury as the focus for unity,
the Lambeth Conference,
the Primates Meeting and the Anglican
112
Consultative Council."'
Despite the lack of an overarching governing body for all Anglican
Churches within the Anglican Communion, a hierarchy does exist
within the Episcopal Church on the national or regional level. Each
national or regional church makes decisions pertaining to the
dioceses and parishes within its hierarchical structure."' The lowest
level of the hierarchy comprises the local churches, also referred to
as parishes or congregations, led by a priest and an elected group of
laity called the vestry." 4 Parishes are organized into geographical
units called dioceses, governed by a bishop with the role of leading,
supervising, and uniting the church." 5 The Protestant Episcopal
Church of the United States is composed of all the Episcopal
dioceses across the country." 6 Church property disputes, like the
one ongoing in Virginia, typically occur when the local parish
chooses to disaffiliate with its diocese. Generally, the discord in
doctrinal belief occurs between the local church and the national
church; thus, when the parish votes to break away from the diocese,
it disaffiliates with the national church as well.
B. Applicable Canons of the Episcopal Church to Church Property
Disputes
The national church has developed both a constitution and canons
to govern the dioceses and parishes. These church laws are meant
to provide a certain level of uniformity within the Episcopal Church
in the United States, as well as a mechanism for resolving church
disputes that may arise on the local level. Two canons are especially
important to the current church property disputes in the Episcopal
Church across the country: Canon 11.6.2 and Canon 1.7.3. The
former states that no trustee or other body authorized by law to hold
property for any diocese or parish may alienate or encumber any
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Information Leaflet, supra note 10.
Id.
Reeder, supra note 19, at 130-31.
Id.
Id. at 131.
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church property, which has been used solely for church services,
without the consent of the bishop." 7 Canon 1.7.3 states that no
trustee or other body authorized by civil or canon law to hold,
manage, or administer real property for any parish shall encumber
or alienate the property without the written consent of the bishop
and standing committee of the diocese to which the parish
belongs."'
These canons demonstrate that local churches derive their
authority to exercise control over the church property from their
unison with the diocese and national church." 9 If the parishes must
seek authority from the bishop to alienate the property, then the
national church must view the diocese as the true owner of the
church property. Thus, the parishes have no right to possess the
property in any manner not aligned with the higher bodies of the
church. When a majority of the parish votes to disaffiliate with the
diocese and national church, then, according to a literal interpretation of the canons, the parish must relinquish its right to possession
because it is no longer holding the property for the diocese. 2 °
Despite the implications of these canons, a crucial point to recognize
is that the local parish trustees-not the bishop, the diocese, or the
national church-hold legal title to the property. Thus, the religious
laws of the Episcopal Church simply declare that any decision
regarding a parish's church property is vested in the bishop,
regardless of the status of title.

III. THE HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VIRGINIA CODE
SECTION 57-9
After the Civil War, Virginia passed a law to govern the property
disputes of churches splitting over doctrinal differences regarding
slavery and secession.' 2 ' At present, Virginia Code section 57-9 will
117. THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, CONSTITUTION & CANONS, Canon 11.6.2, at 62 (2006),
availableat http://www.episcopalarchives.org/CandC_2006.pdf.
118. Id. Canon 1.7.3, at 39.
119. The canons of the Episcopal Church incorporate the implied consent theory articulated
by the Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones. See supra Part I.A.3.
120. The only way this literal interpretation can be avoided is if the diocese actually
consents to the breakaway faction taking the property, an outcome that is extremely unlikely
to play out in practice.
121. Julia Duin, EpiscopalDispute Hinges on 1860s Law, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2007.
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determine the fate of the "largest property dispute in the history of
the Episcopal Church .122
Aside from potentially resolving the
property dispute in Northern Virginia-a dispute intriguing to
many because of George Washington's affiliation with one of the
parishesX2 -this statute will continue to be employed by the courts
as the mechanism for settling church divorces in the future. In line
with the Supreme Court's grant of freedom to the states in Jones v.
Wolf to resolve church property disputes in any manner not
infringing on protections afforded by the First Amendment, Virginia
Code section 57-9 has the potential to serve as a bright-line rule,
applicable outside the Commonwealth, based on neutral principles
of property law and fundamental conceptions of the English
language. The Virginia statute and its focus on division is one
solution other states should adopt in order to resolve hierarchical
church property disputes.
A. Religious Discord in Nineteenth Century Virginia: The Virginia
Religious Freedom Act
In 1867, four years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Watson v. Jones,"4 the Virginia General Assembly passed the
Virginia Religious Freedom Act, the statute now codified as Virginia
Code section 57-9.12' John Baldwin, then Speaker of the House of
Delegates, 2 ' was the impetus behind the passage of the Virginia
Religious Freedom Act. 2 7 The legislation came in response to

122. Id. " ens of millions of dollars of Virginia real estate are at stake in a trial that began
yesterday in Fairfax County Circuit Court, where priests, members of bitterly divided
churches and lawyers filled the pews." Boorstein, supra note 7.
123. See COLONIAL CHURCHES: A SERIES OF SKETCHES OF CHURCHES IN THE ORIGINAL
COLONY 129-30 (W.M. Clark ed., Southern Churchman 1907).
124. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
125. See Finley v. Brent, 12 S.E. 228, 230 (Va. 1890).
126. HAMILTON JAMES ECKENRODE, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA DURING THE
RECONSTRUCTION 41 (The Johns Hopkins Press 1904).
127. Posting of Robert L. McCan to Daily Episcopalian, http://www.episcopalcafe.com/
daily/dioceses/ (Dec. 18,2007,4:21 EST). As a Methodist in Augusta County, Baldwin was not
immune to this religious strife because eighteen Methodist congregations sought to separate
from the northern branch of the church. In fact, Baldwin successfully advocated in court for
the position of the local Methodist congregations when they took advantage of the law in
seeking to keep their property after a majority voted to break away and affiliate with the
southern branch of the church. Id.
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numerous denominational splits in the nineteenth century over the
central issues of the Civil War-slavery and federalism.'2 8
B. Virginia Code Section 57-9: Violation of the FirstAmendment
or Neutral Principleof Law?
The history of Virginia Code section 57-9 sheds light on its
application to the present property dispute and its application to
future denominational splits. The statute's enactment in 1867
provided a means for Virginia courts to resolve church property
disputes vexing the Reconstruction era. However, the Supreme
Court quickly preempted the statute's application in Watson by
requiring state courts to accept as final the decision of the highest
29
church judicatory to which the property matter had been referred.1
In light of the Court's most recent precedent, 130 the question becomes whether Virginia Code section 57-9 applies neutral principles
of law.
The Supreme Court clearly stated in Jones that state courts are
not required to defer to regional or national church leaders when a
property dispute erupts in a hierarchical church. 13' Even prior to
Jones, the Court declared that civil courts do not violate the Free
Exercise Clause by merely "opening their doors" to church property
disputes. 132 Additionally, by applying neutral principles of law
applicable to all property disputes, 1 33 courts are not promoting one
religious theory over another and thus are not violating the
3
Establishment Clause.1 1
Despite the Supreme Court's general assertion that a civil court's
adjudication of a church property dispute does not violate the First
Amendment, the First Amendment tests must be applied to Virginia
Code section 57-9 to ensure the constitutionality of the statute. In

128. See id.
129. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 727.
130. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
131. Id. at 602.
132. Presbyterian Church v. Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449
(1969).
133. Id.
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion....").
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, 3 ' Chief Justice Burger articulated the famous
three-part Lemon test to determine whether a statute violates the
Establishment Clause. A statute is constitutional so long as (1) it
has a secular purpose, (2) its primary effect neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and (3) it refrains from excessively entangling the
state with religion. 3 ' Virginia Code section 57-9 has a secular
purpose in seeking to resolve a property matter within the state's
borders. By adopting this Note's proposed definition of division, 3 v
the primary effect of the statute will not be the advancement of one
religion over another because neither the local congregation nor the
national church is guaranteed to win the property every time.
Finally, a court's application of the statute does not result in
excessive entanglement with religion because the court will not be
deciding any doctrinal questions. The focus is solely on the existence
of a division, which refrains from coming even close to answering
which party adheres to the true tenets of the faith.
Additionally, an examination of the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith'38 confirms the Court's previous
holding in Blue Hull that a civil court's resolution of a church
property dispute does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The
Court held in Smith that "the right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."" 39
The Episcopal Church, therefore, is not relieved of the obligation to
comply with Virginia Code section 57-9 merely because the statute
potentially allows for local congregations to keep title to their
property when disaffiliating with the Episcopal Church even though
the Church's canons require approval of the governing bishop. The
key component of the Smith test is the requirement that the law be
neutral and of general applicability. 140 This requirement goes handin-hand with the requirement in Jones that courts apply neutral

135. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
136. Id. at 612-13.
137. See infra Part IV.C.1.
138. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
139. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
140. See id.
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principles of law. If Virginia courts recognize this Note's definition
of division, then they will meet the requirements of Smith and
Jones, thus avoiding any First Amendment problems.
IV. How To DEFINE DIVISION: DOES WEBSTER'S DEFINITION APPLY
TO VIRGINIA CODE SECTION 57-9?
A. The Application of Virginia Code Section 57-9 to Hierarchical
Church PropertyDisputes
Central to the creation of a bright-line rule is defining "division"
in Virginia Code section 57-9, which reads as follows:
If a division has heretofore occurred or shall hereafter occur in
a church or religious society, to which any such congregation
whose property is held by trustees is attached, the members of
such congregation over 18 years of age may, by a vote of a
majority of the whole number, determine to which branch of the
church or society such congregation shall thereafter belong.
Such determination shall be reported to the circuit court of the
county or city, wherein the property held in trust for such
congregation or the greater part thereof is; and if the determination be approved by the court, it shall be so entered in the court's
civil order book, and shall be conclusive as to the title to and
control of any property held in trust for such congregation, and
be respected and enforced accordingly in all of the courts of the
Commonwealth.14
When congregations vote to disaffiliate with the diocese, and thus
the national hierarchical church, they typically initiate a section 579 proceeding in the Virginia courts, seeking recognition of their
majority vote and the state of title to the property in their name.142
The diocese and national church quickly follow suit by filing their
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (West 2007); see also Recent Decisions, 54 VA. L. REV. 1444,
1457-58 (1968) ("Attempts to reverse this rule [that a local church grants its property to a
general hierarchical church for all time] legislatively have been made in Alabama and
Mississippi where statutes have been enacted which grant local congregations the right to
secede from hierarchical churches and retain local church property when a specified majority
of the congregation agrees that substantial changes in the social policies of the national
churches have occurred." (footnotes omitted)).
142. See Boorstein, supra note 7.
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own complaint against the breakaway churches, requesting that the
court declare the diocese the rightful owner of all property and grant
an injunction forcing the majority congregation members to stop
trespassing on the property. 4" Based on the language of the statute,
if a standard definition of division is employed by the courts, then
the question of who owns the property can be settled in one
proceeding without the need for both sides of the religious dispute
to file complaints. This is because Virginia Code section 57-9 says
that the court's ruling on the parish's vote to disaffiliate "shall be
conclusive as to the title to and control of any property ...
,
According to this language, the trial judge's decision regarding
division should determine the issue of ownership between the local
church and the national church.
The issue of ownership of the property will thus hinge on whether
45
the local congregation adequately exercised its section 57-9 rights.1
If the church voted to break away from the diocese and national
church when no division within the broader church existed, then the
church abandons whatever ownership interest it had in the
property, leaving the property subject to the "find" of the national
church. The issue of division will apply only in those cases where
the local church formerly belonged to the hierarchical church
organization and the branch with which the majority of the local
church votes to affiliate belongs to the overarching church, or
religion, encompassing the hierarchical church. 4

143. Id.
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A).
145. In order to adequately exercise their section 57-9 rights, the local congregations must
satisfy the procedural requirements of the statute in addition to filing suit. For example,
section 57-9 requires a majority vote of members over the age of eighteen. Id.
146. Id. For purposes of resolving church property disputes, the Supreme Court of Virginia
distinguishes between an independent congregation and one that is part of a hierarchical
church, applying different standards of legal analysis in each type of case. See Norfolk
Presbytery v. Bollinger, 201 S.E.2d 752, 755 (Va. 1974); see also Baber v. Caldwell, 152 S.E.2d
23, 26 (Va. 1967).
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B. Division as Defined by the Warring Factions
1. Breakaway and the Formationof a New Polity: The
Definition of the Virginia Episcopal Congregations
The breakaway congregations contend that there was a division
in the Diocese and Episcopal Church as a result of the Episcopal
Church's decisions "to repudiate past positions on human sexuality
and the authority of Scripture."'" 7 The parishes in Virginia that
voted to disaffiliate with the Episcopal Church have suggested their
own interpretation of division in Virginia Code section 57-9. In
recognizing that division is undefined in the statute, the local
churches make two key arguments for how Virginia courts should
define division. 48 The parishes' first argument is that division
should be defined according to the traditional understanding of
division, both in 1867 and today, as "a schism or rupture in a church
' The parishes' second argument
(typically over doctrinal issues)."149
is that division should be defined based on the legislative intent.1 50
Legislative intent must be determined by the plain meaning of the
words used."' The plain meaning of the words stems from the
dictionary meaning of the words. The plain meaning of the word
"division" should encompass both the modern definition of division,
as well as the definition at the time of the statute's enactment.
The term "division" has been defined in virtually the same
manner since the statute's enactment during the Civil War Era.
'[D]ivision' simply means 'the state of being divided into parts or
branches; partition; severance."" 2 The local parishes, therefore,
assert that according to its plain meaning, division in a church "is
just what it sounds like-a breaking into parts, separation,
severance, or partition."'5 3 The problem with this plain meaning
147. CANA Congregations' Memorandum of Law on Scope of Hearing on Congregational
Determinations Pursuant to Va. Code § 57-9, at 3-4, In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church
Litigation, No. 2007-248724 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2007) [hereinafter CANA Mem. of Law].
148. See id. at 5-6.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at 6.
151. Id. (citing Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, Inc., 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (Va.
1990)).
152. Id. (quoting 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 558 (1971)).
153. Id.
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argument is that it is extremely circular. By defining division as
occurring when the parishes in a hierarchical church doctrinally
separate from the church by forming a new polity, no determination
on the issue of division need be made because, by filing the section
57-9 proceeding, the parish concedes that it has "separated" from
the church. Therefore, any time the local church decides to separate
from the hierarchical church structure, the local church would be
entitled to the property so long as the procedural requirements of
Virginia Code section 57-9 are satisfied.' 54 This is essentially the
inverse of "the diocese and national church always wins" rule.
Virginia courts must apply a more rigorous standard than merely
deciding whether a congregation has broken away'5 5 because a rule
that results in one side continually prevailing is not a rule that
should be followed by the courts. 5 '
2. FormalApproval of the Breakaway: The Definition of the
Episcopal Church
The Diocese and Episcopal Church rebut these arguments,
claiming that in order for a division to occur within the church there
must have been formal approval of the new governing polity of the
denomination that left the church.15 v The Episcopal Church,
therefore, argues that a division can only occur within the meaning
of Virginia Code section 57-9 if the national church (or a commission
established on behalf of the church) formally approves the local
church's decision to disaffiliate and join another branch of the
Anglican Communion. If the court were to follow the Episcopal
Church's definition of division, then a very paternalistic rule would

154. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
155. The problem inherent in deciding whether a division occurs is the question of what
factors the court can allow to guide its decision. In Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court made it
abundantly clear that, while civil courts may use neutral principles of law to decide church
property disputes, including such documents as church constitutions, courts cannot resolve
doctrinal disputes and thus any property disputes that hinge on the resolution of church
doctrine. See supra Part I.B.2.
156. Legal scholars made this same criticism when arguing against the deference approach
established by the Supreme Court in Watson. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
157. CANA Mem. of Law, supra note 147, at 6.
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develop, giving the church hierarchy complete power over the
decision of church property ownership.15
Applying the Episcopal Church's proposed definition would
essentially revert to Watson's deference approach because even
though the church tribunal would not be settling the issue of
property ownership, its decision regarding the local church's desire
to break away from the national church would essentially conclude
the issue of ownership.15 9 Virginia Code section 57-9 only allows for
the majority congregation to retain control and ownership of the
property if a division occurs; the national church's interpretation of
how to determine whether a division occurred hinges on whether the
national church gives its approval. If the national church does
approve of the local church's decision to leave the church hierarchy,
a division has occurred and the local church gets the property.
Understanding this implication, the national church, to retain the
property, would never recognize the local church's decision to leave.
Because the deference approach results in the national church
triumphing over the local church every time-unless, of course, the
national church decides graciously to let the breakaway church
retain the property--division as used in section 57-9 should not be
interpreted in such a manner that leads to a Watson approach to
handling church property disputes. 16o
Another fatal flaw in the Episcopal Church's definition of division
is that it seemingly involves implied consent and thus the implied
trust theory. 6 ' If the determination of whether a division has
occurred depends on whether the Episcopal Church approves the
decision to disaffiliate, then the local church is giving its implied
consent to the hierarchy to determine the issue of property ownership. The local church then must be holding the property in an
158. Generally speaking, the national church should have the final word when it comes to
any matter within the purview of the hierarchical church because it is the highest body in the
church structure. History has proven, however, that hierarchical churches are not static.
Doctrinal rifts have resulted in new hierarchical and congregational religious organizations.
Local parishes would be frustrated in initiating a widespread movement to break away from
the hierarchical church if the Virginia courts endorse the Episcopal Church's paternalistic
rule for resolving church property disputes. Thus, as a matter of policy, division should not
be defined in such a way as to hinder religious movements similar to those of the past that
have fundamentally shaped religion in America.
159. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
160. See supra Part IA.2.
161. See supra Part I.A.3
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implied trust for the benefit of the national church. The Supreme
Court of Virginia has declared that the implied trust theory is
inapplicable to church property disputes. In Norfolk Presbytery v.
Bollinger,'6 2 the court stated, "As express trusts for supercongregational churches are invalid under Virginia law no implied
trusts for such denominations may be upheld."' 3 If Virginia courts
cannot apply any form of the implied trust theory, then they cannot
adhere to the deference approach, and consequently, the definition
of division the Diocese and Episcopal Church propose.' Instead,
Virginia courts must adopt a method of resolving intra-church
property disputes more in line with the neutral principles doctrine.'65 The courts can accomplish this feat by properly defining
division.
C. The Definition Solution and the Application of Property Law
1. The Best Definition:A Middle Ground Between the Local
Churchesand the Episcopal Church
Division within a church should be defined in such a way that
neither side of the church property dispute is guaranteed to win
every time. A legal rule promising that the same side to a dispute
will always triumph is a disfunctional legal rule.' 6 Whenever a
162. 201 S.E.2d 752 (Va. 1974).
163. Id. at 758.
164. Id. at 756 ("We are not bound by the rule of Watson v. Jones, ... however, for that case
rested on federal law. Moreover, it did not hold that the implied trust doctrine was the only
constitutional rule for resolving church property disputes.").
165. The Virginia Supreme Court basically advocated the neutral principles approach
before the Supreme Court endorsed it in Jones v. Wolf by declaring that "it is proper to resolve
a dispute over church property by considering the statutes of Virginia, the express language
in the deeds and the provisions of the constitution of the general church." Id. at 756-57. A year
after the Supreme Court articulated the neutral principles doctrine in Jones, the Virginia
Supreme Court stated that to establish a proprietary interest of the national hierarchical
church in the church property of the local congregation, the language of the deeds and the
constitution of the general church should be considered by the trial court in the application
of neutral principles of law. Green v. Lewis, 272 S.E.2d 181, 185-86 (Va. 1980) (holding that
the breakaway congregation could not eliminate the central church's interest in the property
by unilateral action).
166. Take, for example, the law of negligence. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is
ensured a successful outcome every time a complaint is filed. The outcome will hinge on
whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, whether the defendant breached that
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complete separation into factions between the national church and
an aggregate of congregations occurs within the hierarchical church
and each faction has a distinct view regarding key church doctrine,
then the courts should recognize a division as required by Virginia
Code section 57-9. While the courts must look at the doctrinal
positions of each faction, they will not determine which side of the
dispute adheres to the true tenets of the religion and thus no
potential First Amendment infringements will arise.167
The definition of division can thus be broken down into its key
parts. First, the court must determine whether a factional separation has occurred. The court should only find that a factional
separation has occurred if an aggregate of congregations, determined on a macro-level, have disaffiliated with the national church
and either created their own polity or joined a preexisting polity
within the overarching church to which the national church also
belongs. For example, the Episcopal Church of the United States is
a constituent member of the Anglican Communion."'6 If an aggregate of local Anglican congregations within the Episcopal Church of
the United States have decided to leave the Episcopal Church and
instead affiliate with another constituent member of the Anglican
Communion, this would meet the factional separation requirement
of division.
Part of the factional separation requirement is the determination
of whether an aggregate of congregations have separated. This
analysis will require the court to look at the church on the national
level to determine whether a separation around the same doctrinal
dispute is occurring. This macro-level analysis will ensure that a
separation is happening on a level beyond a single local church
filing a section 57-9 proceeding. Thus, one local congregation's
decision to leave its diocese and the national church will never

duty, and whether the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages. Courts and
state legislatures have clearly defined when a duty is owed and the legal standard for breach
of the duty of care. The question will be whether such a breach has occurred based on the
attendant facts. Likewise, by following the definition of division proposed by this Note, neither
the local congregation nor the national church is ensured success. Rather, the court will apply
the rule regarding division, just as it does the rules of other legal regimes, to the facts of the
case.
167. See supra Part III.B.
168. See Information Leaflet, supra note 10.
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suffice for purposes of Virginia Code section 57-9.169 A division can
hardly be said to have occurred when only one church out of
thousands has decided to leave. There is also a timing component to
this part of the definition. The congregations must be separating
close enough in time for the court to find that the separation
resulted from the same doctrinal issue. 7 ° If too much time has
elapsed when looking at the aggregate of congregations, then the
court must assume that the congregations chose to separate for
different reasons. The type of doctrinal dispute needed to cause a
division for purposes of section 57-9 must be of such magnitude that
a large number of churches separate around the same time.
The second part of this Note's proposed definition of division is
the requirement that the local churches separate because of the
same doctrinal dispute. The nature of the church doctrine has no
relevance to the determination of division; the analysis should solely
focus on whether the aggregate of congregations are separating from
the national church because of the same doctrinal dispute. The
determination of whether the same doctrinal dispute motivates all
the churches will not entangle the courts into matters of religion.' 7 '
The courts will look at only the reasons articulated by each local
congregation for leaving the church and determine whether these
reasons are essentially alike. 172 The courts will not be endorsing
either 3faction's beliefs and thus will not be establishing any reli17
gion.
If a court finds that the two requirements of division have been
met, then a division has occurred for purposes of section 57-9, and

169. It is irrelevant that a "division" exists between the particular parish and the national
church because division for purposes of section 57-9 should not exist on a singular level.
170. This requirement does not mean that congregations must coordinate their separation
from the national church. The court should solely focus on the raw number of churches
separating. While there is potential for churches to collude in order to take title from the
national church, the risk of collusion is irrelevant because those churches which chose to
separate in unison would have separated regardless of the other churches.
171. See supra Part III.B.
172. For example, if an aggregate of congregations separates from the national church
because it holds a more traditionalist view of human sexuality, this would be sufficient to find
that the congregations separated based on the same doctrinal dispute. But, if half of the
congregations separates because of their conservative view of human sexuality while the other
half separates because they disagree with the national church's fiscal spending, this would
not be the same doctrinal dispute.
173. See supra Part III.B.
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the only hurdle for the majority faction of the local church to
overcome in retaining property ownership is following the statutory
procedure. 71 4 If no such division has occurred, then the local church's
actions result in abandonment of property.
2. Property Law to the Rescue: Abandonment Ends the Church
Dispute
When a local church votes to separate from the hierarchical
church to which it formerly belonged when no division occurs, 7 ' the
church essentially abandons the property and the hierarchical
church becomes the rightful owner.'7 6 The legal rule of abandonment prevents courts from having to decide the issue of ownership
in two separate suits because the national church will no longer
have to file a separate lawsuit seeking ownership of the property
and an injunction against the local church from trespassing because
the resolution of the section 57-9 proceeding will end the dispute on
ownership.
"[JIntention is a prime factor in determining whether there has
been an abandonment. And courts must determine intent from what
the actor said and did; intent, though subjective, is determined from
the objective facts at hand."'77 The objective fact at hand is that the
local church voted to disaffiliate with the church when no division
actually existed. 7 ' This action manifests intent to abandon the
property previously possessed by the trustees of the parish. The
hierarchical church to which the parish previously belonged then
becomes the rightful owner of the property by nature of its claim to
174. Virginia Code section 57-9 requires that the vote pursuant to a division be made only
by members of the congregation, that the members be at least eighteen years of age, and that
the vote be supported by a majority. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9 (West 2007).
175. See supra Part IV.C.1.
176.
Abandonment of tangible personal property means that the owner thereof
voluntarily relinquishes possession thereof with the intention of terminating his
ownership, and with no intention of vesting title in another. When such property
has been so abandoned, the first person who takes possession thereof for the
purpose of ownership generally and in the absence of special circumstances,
acquires title thereto.
Talley v. Drumheller, 130 S.E. 385, 388 (Va. 1925).
177. Hawley v. Commonwealth, 144 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Va. 1965).
178. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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the property and the invalid action of the local parish in voting to
break away and affiliate with another polity of the overarching
church. This settles the question of who owns the church property.
CONCLUSION

Despite the difficulty of crafting bright-line rules to settle complex
legal issues, courts have the ability to establish clear-cut methods
for handling problems that come before the bench. A church
property dispute in the wake of doctrinal discord within a hierarchical church organization is one example of a legal issue conducive to
resolution by a bright-line rule.' 79 The Supreme Court in Watson v.
Jones proposed a bright-line rule of complete deference to the
decision of the church hierarchy tribunal resolving the property
dispute. The fatal flaw of the deference approach is that its application is one-sided in favor of the national church. Additionally, the
implied consent theory underlying the reasoning of the deference
approach results in the application of the implied trust theory,
which Virginia has expressly rejected. Recognizing the need to craft
an alternative method for handling church property disputes, the
Supreme Court, a century later in Jones v. Wolf, endorsed the
neutral principles doctrine crafted by the Georgia courts. Once
again, inherent problems arose in this newer method for resolving
church disputes, namely confusion over what exactly are neutral
principles of law and how courts should apply them. The Supreme
Court did, however, grant states the freedom to decide church
property disputes in any manner so long as the method employed
does not violate the First Amendment protection against the
establishment of religion and the guarantee of the separation of
church and state.
During the Civil War Era, Virginia crafted a statute to handle
church property disputes. The statute has great potential to resolve
the issue of who owns the church property in the wake of a religious
divorce. Key to becoming a bright-line rule, the term "division,"
179. While the brightest line would be a rule that the national church always wins, or
alternatively, that the local congregation always gets the property, the purpose of the legal
system is not merely to rubber-stamp the decision of one litigant every time a dispute arises.
Thus, a bright-line rule that enables the courts to clearly resolve an issue without ensuring
that the same side always wins fits well within the American legal system.
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central to Virginia Code section 57-9, must be defined to ensure that
the courts are not involved in deciding doctrinal disputes and that
neither side of the dispute is certain to win every time discord
arises. If division within a church is defined as a complete separation into factions with distinct views of key church doctrine, then
the courts will be able to settle the property disputes in a swift and
timely manner. This rule will have staying power as new property
disputes arise in Virginia within hierarchical church organizations.
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